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Abstract 
This article investigates the determinants of assignments to European Parliament 
negotiating teams comprising both rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs. We re-
examine the argument that under-representation of MEPs (Members of the 
European Parliament) from new Member States on these key posts after 
enlargement might have been due to a 'learning phase'. We find that MEPs from 
newer Member States remain considerably less likely to act as rapporteurs 
during the second term after enlargement (2009–14). Most importantly, this trend 
also holds for shadow rapporteurships under the co-decision procedure, which is 
when they matter most. This structural under-representation entails important 
implications for European integration, most importantly that MEPs from newer 
Member States are less able to influence legislation. We suggest that the patterns 
we find could be the result of reduced willingness, a more limited skill set, or a 
structural disadvantage of MEPs from the accession states in the report allocation 
process. 
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Introduction 
Rapporteurs are the ‘primary legislator’ (Yordanova, 2010, p. 100) inside the 
European Parliament (EP), and have received considerable attention (e.g. 
Kaeding, 2004, 2005; Yoshinaka et al., 2010; Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003). They 
draft the legislature's opinion and negotiate on its behalf with the European 
Commission (Commission) and Council of Ministers (Council). Accordingly, 
they are the linchpin of intra- and inter-institutional decision-making and have 
important procedural privileges. As the importance of rapporteurs has increased, 
they have been more tightly controlled by shadow rapporteurs from competing 
party groups (e.g. Judge and Earnshaw, 2010).1 ‘Shadows’ follow the progress of 
a file through committee and plenary, and can join the rapporteur in closed-door 
trilogues with the Commission and Council. In this article, we investigate the 
allocation of rapporteurships and shadow rapporteurships in the 2009–14 term 
(EP7). 
 
In so doing, we re-evaluate the finding by Hurka and Kaeding (2012) that MEPs 
from the accession states were less likely to become EP chief negotiators in the 
2004–09 term (EP6), and re-examine their argument that this might have been 
due to a learning phase. This expectation is supported by recent research by 
Daniel (2013, appendix), who shows that it is common for MEPs from new 
Member States to be allocated fewer reports in their first term after accession. If 
MEPs and their national party delegations had to familiarize themselves with the 
functioning of the EP after the 2004/07 enlargement (Bailer, 2009), we would 
expect them to have accumulated this expertise after five years (De Clerck-
Sachsse and Kaczyński, 2009). As a corollary, the effect should have disappeared 
in the second term after enlargement, as in other areas of legislative behaviour 
(Lindstädt et al., 2012). We further probe the learning argument by analysing the 
appointment of shadow rapporteurs, providing the first large-scale analysis 
shedding light on ‘shadows’ in addition to rapporteurs. From a legislative 
careers perspective, shadow rapporteurships can be considered a stepping stone 
toward rapporteurships. They provide an opportunity for MEPs to learn on the 
job the ins and outs of this important position, while demonstrating their 
                                                 
1 Party group coordinators on committees bid points allocated to them in line with the size of 
their group in order to win a report for the group. All other groups can nominate a shadow 
rapporteur.   
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suitability for rapporteurships at the same time.2 Thus, under-representation 
among shadow rapporteurs would point to a deeply ingrained feature of the EP, 
as it would perpetuate the imbalance among rapporteurs. 
 
We draw on comprehensive data on the 2009–14 legislative term to test 
hypotheses resulting from the expectation that the ‘learning phase’ is now over. 
The dataset includes the allocation of 2161 reports and 6589 shadow reports to 
851 MEPs, i.e. the population of reports retrievable from the website of the EP 
after the last plenary session in April 2014. Overall, we find that even in the 
second term after enlargement, MEPs from formerly new Member States are 
under-represented as rapporteurs in general, and under the co-decision 
procedure in particular. Most importantly, this also holds for co-decision shadow 
reports, which are easier to obtain and a natural first step toward lead 
rapporteurships. While the effect is smaller than in EP6, and smaller for shadow 
reports than for full reports, the results remain statistically significant and thus 
do not support the learning argument. Under-representation of MEPs from 
newer Member States among rapporteurs seems to have become a structural 
feature of the EP. 
 
This raises important questions on how MEPs from these countries use their time 
in office, and what their ambitions are. In other words, are these MEPs less 
willing, lacking skills, or simply disadvantaged? Regardless of the causes of 
under-representation, its consequences for European integration seem to be clear: 
MEPs from newer Member States are arguably less able to influence European 
legislation as a result of their absence from the influential post of rapporteur. In 
order to increase their legislative influence and to advance their careers inside 
the EP, we suggest that these MEPs may want to become more assertive in 
demanding first shadow and then full rapporteurships. In a similar vein, national 
parties should promote the selection of candidates with an interest in a long-term 
career in the EP if they wish to influence European legislation. At this point, we 
                                                 
2 The underlying argument is that coordinators, upon winning a report for a group, will be more 
likely to award it to an MEP who has proved to command the necessary skill set required of 
rapporteurs.  In addition, coordinators might use rapporteurships on important files as a reward 
for MEPs who took on the ‘chore’ of acting as shadow rapporteur, making it an informal 
precondition for junior MEPs to represent the EP. 
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should emphasize that the article is interested in descriptive instead of 
substantive representation (Phillips, 1995). In other words, we do not suggest 
that interests of MEPs from the accession states cannot be represented by MEPs 
from the EU-15. The extent to which this is actually the case is an interesting and 
important question for future research, but cannot be answered within the scope 
of this article. 
 
The article proceeds as follows. We first review the literature on rapporteurship 
assignment, and discuss the impact of enlargement on our expectations. We then 
present the data. On this basis we delve into the empirical analysis, which is 
followed by a discussion of the results. 
 
 
The Role of Rapporteurs and Shadow Rapporteurs in EU Law-Making 
Committee proceedings are to a large extent shaped by key players who 
contribute to building consensus (Settembri and Neuhold, 2009). Next to 
committee chairs (Neuhold, 2001, p. 5f) and political group co-ordinators 
(Kaeding and Obholzer, 2012), it is rapporteurs in particular who perform this 
important task and thereby impact considerably upon the outcome of EU law-
making (Benedetto, 2005; Hoyland, 2006; Rasmussen, 2011; Hurka, 2013; 
Mamadouh and Raunio, 2003; Costello and Thomson, 2010; 2011). 
 
Inside the European Parliament, rapporteurs are ‘legislative entrepreneurs’ 
(Benedetto, 2005) provided with special access to resources unavailable to other 
MEPs (Kaeding, 2005, p. 85). Most importantly, their selection ‘determines the 
range of political opinions that are represented in the policy positions of the 
European Parliament’ (Hausemer, 2006, p. 512). Outside the EP, rapporteurs are 
crucial ‘relais actors’ during (in-)formal trilogues (Yoshinaka et al., 2010; Farrell 
and Héritier, 2004) with Council and Commission. This role of rapporteurs has 
become particularly prevalent during EP7, with 85 per cent (EP6: 72 per cent) of 
co-decision files concluded at first reading, and a further 8 per cent (10 per cent) 
at early second reading (Pittella et al., 2014). 
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At the same time and due to the eminent importance of rapporteurs, the 
appointment of so-called ‘shadow rapporteurs’ by those political groups that do 
not hold the rapporteurship has become increasingly significant: ‘In some cases 
they […] practically constitute informal sub-committees’ (Corbett et al., 2011, p. 
159). This process is reflected in changes to the EP's internal rules of procedure 
stipulating that the EP's negotiation teams ‘shall be led by the rapporteur […] 
and comprise at least the shadow rapporteurs from each political group’ (Rule 
73, §3).3 The more salient a file, the tighter the control by shadow rapporteurs 
(Rasmussen and Reh, 2013, p. 1019). In the end, their relationship is of ‘some 
significance in building and sustaining the necessary consensus to secure a 
successful legislative outcome’ (Judge and Earnshaw, 2010, p. 57). Consequently, 
rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs ‘tend to work in tandem’ and jointly lead 
the files through the decision-making process, despite hierarchy (Ringe, 2010, p. 
59). 
 
But shadow rapporteurs are not only influential as the primary negotiation 
partners of the rapporteur within the committee; they are also ‘the primary 
sources of information for their party colleagues’ (Ringe, 2010, p. 59). They 
occupy a pivotal position within their political group (Ringe, 2010, footnote 85), 
acting as a ‘powerful focal point of group activity on dossiers, leading 
discussions on the group's behalf and mobilizing and coordinating group activity 
in the tabling of amendments in committee’ (Judge and Earnshaw, 2010, p. 57). In 
practice, they mobilize their party group in preparation of amendments and 
therefore play a prominent role in the quest to find consensus within the 
committee ‘across the boundaries of political groups’ (Settembri and Neuhold, 
2009, p. 142) by monitoring the work of the rapporteur and by reporting back to 
their respective political group. Furthermore, they provide party group co-
ordinators with an opportunity ‘to spread the burden of speaking and 
negotiating for their Group. […] A particularly striking example of this was the 
REACH chemicals legislation, where the rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs 
[…] met on an almost weekly basis over an extended period of time to identify 
                                                 
3 Reh (2014) reflects on the EP´s changes to its internal rules by asking under which conditions 
early agreements are democratically tenable or problematic (see also Obholzer and Reh, 2012). 
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the main area of agreement and possible solutions for the key problems at stake’ 
(Corbett et al., 2011, p. 159). 
 
All in all, rapporteurs and their shadows together represent key negotiating 
actors in shaping EU laws, and therefore have become ‘particularly prominent 
“targets” for the supply of information and, in reverse […] significant 
“consumers” of information from outside organizations’ (Judge and Earnshaw, 
2003, p. 105). The close co-operation between the rapporteur and his or her 
shadows suggests that the latter position helps getting acquainted with the 
intricacies of the job of the rapporteur and determines the likelihood that 
incumbent MEPs are getting reelected (van Thomme et al., 2015). This justifies 
our argument that shadow reports may be a stepping stone toward lead 
rapporteurships. 
 
 
After Enlargement: Learning on the Job? 
Given their prominent role, one might expect most MEPs to aspire to act as 
rapporteur on important files. However, despite their acknowledged significance 
for the outcome of intra- and inter-institutional negotiations, Hurka and Kaeding 
(2012) find that the odds of becoming rapporteur were significantly lower for 
MEPs from new Member States in the 2004–09 term. Most importantly, this 
pattern holds when comparing MEPs from the latest accession countries with 
first-time MEPs from the old Member States. Daniel (2013, p. 844) shows that this 
finding is not limited to the ‘big bang’ eastern enlargement, but likewise holds 
for earlier enlargement rounds. It has been argued previously that this initial 
under-representation could have been the result of a learning process for 
freshmen. As Bailer (2009, p. 194) pointed out, ‘a substantial number of 
parliamentarians from new member countries […] meant a possible learning 
period in which the newcomers had to learn the rules of the house’. In other 
words, the full integration of new legislators into the legislative operations of the 
EP is the final result of a gradual process that takes some time to evolve. During 
the ‘initiation phase’, when new legislators are familiarized with the norms and 
procedures of the chamber, the allocation of reports would therefore follow a 
‘look but don't touch’ logic. The fact that the under-representation of new MEPs 
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from the accession states was especially significant for particularly salient reports 
further buttressed the learning process argumentation. Inexperienced MEPs from 
Eastern Europe were primarily allocated consultation reports in which the 
European Parliament has less impact on the final outcome. 
 
The learning view outlined above is further corroborated by studies on party 
group development and voting behaviour. Bressanelli (2012) highlights the 
challenge that enlargement posed for political groups which were confronted 
with more heterogeneous national party delegations than before. Nevertheless, 
Hix and Noury (2009) show that voting behaviour was ‘more of the same’: party 
groups continued their trend toward higher voting cohesion, even though the 
pattern was not entirely consistent across the political spectrum. Lindstädt et al. 
(2012) nuance these findings in providing evidence of a learning process among 
MEPs from the new Member States. They find that newcomers adapted their 
behaviour and increasingly voted with their party group, eventually adopting 
their peers' behaviour. 
 
A similar learning process may occur when it comes to rapporteurships. In fact, 
we expect the learning process to take place at two levels. First, individual MEPs 
may adapt their behaviour in order to secure rapporteurships. The finding of 
Lindstädt et al. (2012) may be due to the realization of these MEPs that the group 
rather than the national party controls their career progress in the EP. Voting 
behaviour might be instrumental in being rewarded by the group (Hix et al., 
2007).4 Hence, MEPs may be allocated more reports because they learned to toe 
the party group line in the second term after enlargement. 
 
Second, organizational learning may take place at the level of national party 
delegations. If MEPs require specific skill sets (e.g., negotiating skills or language 
skills) to be capable of acting effectively as rapporteurs, national parties may 
have adapted their candidate selection in the run-up to the 2009 elections. As a 
consequence, they may have nominated candidates that would be able to 
successfully work as rapporteurs so as to maximize the party's influence on 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, Bressanelli (2014) argues that groups adopted better internal coordination of 
positions, possibly seeing the preferences of MEPs from new Member States more frequently 
accommodated in the party line. 
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policy. Likewise, national parties represent fora for information exchange 
between incumbent and newcomer MEPs. Lindstädt et al. (2012) find that 
newcomer MEPs from old Member States were less likely to vote against the 
party group line than newcomer MEPs from new Member States in EP6. If that 
was because newcomers could learn from their incumbent peers in the national 
party, EP7 would have provided this opportunity for MEPs from new Member 
States for the first time. Thus, learning might have taken place in the framework 
of national parties. 
 
In a nutshell, the learning argument implies that we do not expect any systematic 
difference between MEPs from old and newer Member States in rapporteurship 
allocation in EP7. This expectation is further bolstered by the findings of De 
Clerck-Sachsse and Kaczyński (2009), who argued that the initiation phase of 
new MEPs from the accession countries was already completed during the 
second half of the sixth term as far as the allocation of co-decision reports was 
concerned. If this is really the case, then we should no longer observe any 
imbalances in the seventh legislative period. 
 
H1. MEPs from old and new Member States are equally likely to become rapporteur in 
EP7. 
 
In addition, we expect the same hypothesis to hold for shadow rapporteurship 
assignment. 
 
H2. MEPs from old and new Member States are equally likely to become shadow 
rapporteur in EP7. 
 
 
Research Design and Data 
In the following analysis, the dependent variable is a simple count variable 
representing the sum of reports allocated to an MEP during the 2009-2014 
legislative term. We differentiate between reports and shadow reports and split 
these into a total of 11 different types of files for each. Accordingly, the analysis 
distinguishes, for example, between important co-decision files under the 
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ordinary legislative procedure that produce binding legislation, and non-binding 
resolutions (e.g. ‘own-initiative reports’).5 The main independent variable is a 
dummy variable indicating whether an MEP represents one of the 13 Member 
States that joined the EU in 2004, in 2007 and most recently in 2013. 
 
We use a series of variables that control for factors that might influence report 
allocation. First, we include a dummy variable indicating whether an MEP 
served as chair or vice-chair of a committee during the term (chair or vice-chair). 
This is because the committee leadership often takes on unpopular reports that 
do not find any bidder among the groups' co-ordinators (Hausemer, 2006; 
Corbett et al., 2011). Next, we draw on VoteWatch Europe's measure of the 
proportion of plenary roll-call votes in which the MEP participated while in 
office (attendance). In addition, co-ordinators may take experience into account 
when allocating reports (Kaeding, 2004). We therefore control for the number of 
terms that an MEP has served (EP experience). Moreover, as Daniel (2013) 
recently identified a gender effect, we introduce a corresponding dummy 
variable (female). 
 
Finally, as for inter-institutional dynamics, Hoyland (2006) has found that MEPs 
whose national parties are represented in the Council are more likely to serve as 
rapporteurs. In a similar vein, we expect MEPs whose Member State holds the 
rotating presidency to have a higher likelihood of being selected, and therefore 
control with a dummy for MEPs fulfilling this criterion (Council Presidency). On 
top of this, we include party group and committee dummies. First, these capture 
the unequal distribution of MEPs from old and new Member States across these 
organizational entities (see e.g. Corbett et al., 2011, pp. 86–111). Second, they 
account for differences in the number of reports allocated to the different 
standing committees of the EP and groups (Costello and Thomson, 2011). 
                                                 
5
 This allows us to provide a disaggregated analysis controlling for the type of report. However, 
building on an aggregate analysis of all reports, we constrain the further analysis to three types of 
legislative procedures (co-decision, own initiative and consultation). We do so both for practical 
and technical reasons: first, we lack the space to pursue a detailed analysis of all “exotic” 
legislative procedures. Second, since only very few reports are allocated under those latter 
procedures, we would run into estimation problems. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the 
models for “all reports” include also reports allocated under procedures other than co-decision, 
own initiative and consultation. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
In order to put our hypotheses to an empirical test, we automatically extracted 
(‘crawled’) data from the website of the EP and complemented this where 
necessary by additional hand-coded information, as well as VoteWatch data.6 
Our resulting data set is composed of all 851 MEPs that served in the EP during 
the 2004–09 term.7 Figures 1a and 1b display the distribution of the dependent 
variables as they are analysed below. More than half of all MEPs received at least 
one report, while 242 MEPs did not receive a single report. The most active MEP 
of the seventh term was Barbara Matera (EPP, Italy), who drafted a total of 54 
reports. Outliers like Matera are mostly on the Budget (BUDG) and Budgetary 
Control (CONT) committees, where large numbers of reports are allocated en 
bloc. Under the co-decision procedure, the outlier was Vital Moreira (S&D, 
Portugal), who drafted 19 co-decision reports, presumably due to his status as 
chairman of the Committee on International Trade (INTA). As far as consultation 
reports are concerned, our data show that the procedure has lost importance 
after the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty.8 Only 100 different MEPs drafted 
reports under the consultation procedure, which implies that a vast majority – 
751 MEPs – did not draft any consultation reports at all. Finally, as Figure 2 
illustrates, the distribution of reports is highly proportional to the party groups' 
seat shares in plenary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 http://www.votewatch.eu 
7 Two MEPs left the EP even before the first roll-call vote took place in plenary. They are 
excluded from the analysis, as are those who became MEP only after the last plenary session. 
8 The display of the corresponding histogram is omitted due to space limitations. 
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Figure 1a: Number of reports per MEP (7th legislative term) 
 
 
Figure 1b: Number of co-decision reports per MEP (7th legislative term)  
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Figure 2: Report allocation across party groups and legislative procedures (7th EP) 
 
Data Analysis 
In order to model the allocation of (shadow) reports in the seventh EP and test 
the research hypotheses developed above, negative binomial regressions are 
required due to over-dispersion of the data.9 The resulting models are presented 
in Tables 1 and 2 for lead and shadow rapporteurships respectively.10 The 
models lead us to two central conclusions: first, the under-representation of 
MEPs from the accession states in the report allocation process continued 
throughout the seventh legislative term of the institution. Second, also the 
allocation of shadow rapporteurships under the co-decision procedure was 
biased against MEPs from newer Member States. In the following, we consider 
the results in some more detail. 
                                                 
9 We also considered the application of zero-inflated count models, which would be more 
appropriate from a statistical point of view. Unfortunately, we are lacking a clear theoretical 
explanation for excess zeros. If we model excess zeros with the share of the legislative term an 
MEP served in the institutions, the variable that might be most useful in this context, we obtain 
the same substantive results. However, the significance levels for our main independent variable 
of interest drop to the .05 level. In the appendix, we also report the results of logit models, which 
use dichotomized versions of our count variables. 
10 We report incidence rate ratios, which imply a negative relationship if their value is located 
between 0 and 1 and a positive association if they are larger than one. For a more detailed 
description of incidence rate ratios, consult Long and Freese (2006, p. 359ff.). 
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Table 1 suggests that ten years after eastern enlargement, MEPs from newer EU 
Member States still have not caught up with their peers from the older EU-15 in 
the report allocation process. Even after controlling for confounding factors, the 
negative effect of being a member from the accession states on the number of 
allocated reports persists and is still remarkably similar to what has been found 
for EP6. Comparing the effect across different legislative procedures, we also 
detect the same pattern as during EP6. Models I–III show that, controlling for a 
series of variables, MEPs from the 13 newer Member States only receive a 
number of reports that is decreased by a factor of 0.7 to 0.8 in comparison to 
MEPs from the EU-15, depending on the legislative procedure in place. Most 
importantly, they still receive fewer reports under co-decision, i.e. the ‘ordinary 
legislative procedure’ following the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. In 
contrast, the relationship does not hold for consultation reports (Model IV). 
 
 
Table 1: Negative Binomial Regressions: Report allocation in the 7th European 
Parliament 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 All reports Co-
decision 
Own 
initiative 
Consultation 
MEP from 
accession state 
0.78*** 0.78* 0.72*** 1.26 
 (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.37) 
Chair or Vice-Chair 1.71*** 1.42*** 1.47*** 2.05** 
 (0.16) (0.19) (0.14) (0.63) 
Attendance 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.01 1.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
EP experience 1.08** 1.06 0.97 1.45*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.16) 
Female 1.14 0.99 1.14 1.43 
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.43) 
Council Presidency 0.90 0.77** 1.04 1.08 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.31) 
EPP 1.34** 1.19 0.99 1.71 
 (0.17) (0.22) (0.14) (0.74) 
S&D 1.21 1.35 1.07 1.47 
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 (0.16) (0.26) (0.15) (0.65) 
GREENS 0.89 0.93 1.08 0.49 
 (0.16) (0.24) (0.20) (0.35) 
ECR 1.04 1.22 0.98 0.77 
 (0.20) (0.32) (0.20) (0.50) 
EUL-NGL 0.83 0.73 0.93 0.81 
 (0.18) (0.25) (0.22) (0.61) 
EFD 0.52** 0.43* 0.59* 0.00 
 (0.14) (0.20) (0.17) (0.00) 
NI 0.29*** 0.34** 0.14*** 0.88 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.08) (0.75) 
     
Committee control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 851 851 851 851 
*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Incidence Rate Ratios reported; standard errors in 
parentheses; reference group: ALDE. The share of the term actually served is 
incorporated as a measure for exposure. 
 
The control variables generally support the existing literature on report 
allocation. Chairmen and women received more reports than regular or 
substitute committee members, due to the fact that they are responsible for the 
drafting of reports which are not acquired by any political group. The results also 
underscore previous findings on the importance of attendance rates for the 
allocation of reports. Party groups reward active MEPs with influential positions 
in the legislative process. Predicted probabilities calculated on the basis of Model 
I suggest that MEPs from the accession states can make up their disadvantage in 
allocated reports if they score highly in terms of attendance. Everything else 
being equal, Model I predicts a 25 per cent probability of a zero count for MEPs 
from the EU-15 with an attendance record of 80 per cent. For MEPs from the 
accession states with a perfect attendance record, this probability is 21.5 per cent. 
An MEP's seniority is relevant to her chances to obtain rapporteurships, which 
corroborates recent findings by Daniel (2013). Our results suggest, however, that 
the relationship does not hold across all types of legislative procedures. More 
senior MEPs are especially active in the drafting of consultation reports, which 
suggests that experience, and perhaps good contacts, are particularly relevant if 
the EP does not have any clear-cut procedural power. In contrast to Daniel 
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(2013), our results do not confirm a gender discrimination effect in the report 
allocation process. Finally, we find that MEPs whose home countries held the 
Council Presidency were under-represented in the allocation of co-decision 
reports. However, this finding does not hold for the other legislative procedures. 
 
Figure 3: Report allocation: predicted probabilities for newcomer MEPs (all 
reports) 
 
 
Yet, what if we only compare the performance of newcomer MEPs (i.e. all MEPs 
serving their first term) from the longer-standing Member States with those from 
the accession states? In Figure 3, we plot predicted probabilities for this specific 
group of MEPs which can be obtained from Model I (all reports). The data show 
that the predicted probability for a zero-count for a newcomer MEP from the 
longer-standing Member States is about 6 percentage points lower than the same 
probability for a newcomer MEP from the EU-13 (holding all other variables at 
their means). It is interesting to note that the predicted probability for a count of 
exactly one is even slightly higher for newcomer MEPs from the EU-13. 
However, newcomers from the EU-15 are consistently more likely to draft two or 
more reports. Accordingly, the under-performance of MEPs from the accession 
states is not merely due to a lack of political experience. If this were the case, 
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their rates of report allocation would be similar to the rates of newcomer MEPs 
from the EU-15. 
 
Yet Figure 3 also shows that we cannot confirm a major difference in the 
predicted probabilities for the number of allocated shadow reports among 
newcomer MEPs from the EU-13 and the EU-15. In fact, the figures are fairly 
similar across different report counts. However, if we differentiate between 
different types of reports, we find that the non-significant relationship on the 
aggregate report level (Table 2, Model I) masks the fact that MEPs from the 
accession states are significantly under-represented when shadow reports are 
distributed under the co-decision procedure (Table 2, Model II). As far as reports 
under the remaining procedures are concerned, we find that the relationship is 
either insignificant (Model III for own-initiative reports) or reversed (Model IV, 
consultation reports). Thus, while MEPs from the EU-13 are not under-
represented for shadow rapporteurships on the aggregate level, they are clearly 
under-represented for politically important co-decision files and over-
represented for politically less important consultation files. Thus, patterns of 
under-representation are particularly pronounced for reports of relatively strong 
political impact and not detectable or even reversed if the EP's power in the 
legislative process is smaller. As for the control variables, the two largest groups 
in the EP accrue significantly fewer shadow reports across all legislative 
procedures than the group Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE), which again serves as a point of reference. Of course, this is due to the 
fact that those groups already receive a comparably large number of lead 
rapporteurships. Finally, being present in plenary meetings is rewarded not only 
with lead rapporteurships but also with shadow rapporteurships. Women tend 
to be over-represented among shadow rapporteurs, but as we have discovered 
above, this does not imply that they are under-represented in the allocation of 
lead rapporteurships. 
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Table 2: Negative Binomial Regressions: Shadow report allocation in the 7th European 
Parliament 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 All reports Co-
decision 
Own 
initiative 
Consultation 
MEP from 
accession state 
0.88 0.80** 0.95 1.41* 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.29) 
Chair or Vice-Chair 1.26** 0.93 1.10 1.00 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.23) 
Attendance 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.02*** 1.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
EP experience 0.89*** 0.93* 0.86*** 0.86* 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) 
Female 1.20** 1.10 1.25** 1.16 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.22) 
Council Presidency 0.93 0.88 0.89 0.77 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.15) 
EPP 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.17*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
S&D 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.42*** 0.37*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) 
GREENS 1.09 1.16 1.31* 1.42 
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.45) 
ECR 1.36* 1.50** 1.55*** 1.48 
 (0.23) (0.26) (0.25) (0.51) 
EUL-NGL 1.57** 1.81*** 1.78*** 1.85* 
 (0.28) (0.34) (0.31) (0.66) 
EFD 0.76 0.78 0.90 0.67 
 (0.16) (0.18) (0.19) (0.30) 
NI 0.27*** 0.13*** 0.29*** 0.26** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.08) (0.15) 
     
Committee control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 851 851 851 851 
*p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Incidence Rate Ratios reported; standard errors in 
parentheses; reference group: ALDE. The share of the term actually served is 
incorporated as a measure for exposure. 
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In sum, we observe that the learning process that had been deemed responsible 
for the under-representation following the enlargement in 2004 has either been 
prolonged for another five years or, as we will argue below, might have never 
really occurred. Apparently, the under-representation of MEPs from Eastern 
Europe in the report allocation process was not simply a temporary 
phenomenon, as put forward by other authors (De Clerck-Sachsse and 
Kaczyński, 2009), but in fact the relatively low legislative activity of the 
newcomer MEPs seems to have become a structural feature of the institution. 
 
 
Discussion: Less Willing, Lacking Skills, or Simply Disadvantaged? 
Why has the under-representation of MEPs from formerly new Member States in 
the post of (shadow) rapporteur become a structural feature of the EP? In 
principle, the influence of the rapporteur over outcomes should be an incentive 
for policy-seeking MEPs to pursue these posts. While MEPs may have required 
an adaptation phase to understand the norms inside the EP (Lindstädt et al., 
2012), we expected these effects to have disappeared in EP7. While the size of the 
effect in our analysis is somewhat smaller for EP7 than it was for EP6, as well as 
smaller for shadows than for lead rapporteurs, the overwhelming evidence 
suggests that learning in this field does not seem to be taking place. 
 
There are three main readings of these unexpected results. First, the incentive set 
of this group of MEPs may differ from that of MEPs from older Member States, 
making them less willing to take on the workload that accrues to a (shadow) 
rapporteur. Second, MEPs from these countries may select different routes 
toward effective representation of their constituents' interests and therefore have 
distinct skill sets; as a consequence, they may be better suited for other positions 
or activities than those of the rapporteur. Third, there might be a systematic bias 
in rapporteurship allocation, thus disadvantaging MEPs from newer Member 
States. In the following, we discuss these three interpretations in some more 
detail. 
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Less Willingness? 
MEPs from newer Member States may face different incentives than their 
colleagues from the older Member States, and hence may be less inclined to take 
on a (shadow-) rapporteurship. For instance, Hoyland et al. (2013) show that 
candidate-centred electoral systems discourage MEPs from activity at the 
European level. Moreover, MEPs' national career ambitions impact their 
legislative behaviour, leading to higher rates of defection from their party groups 
(Meserve et al., 2009). As Scarrow suggests, ‘dominant political career patterns 
provide useful clues about expected activity within legislatures’ (Scarrow, 1997, 
p. 254). We know that legislative career paths in and beyond the EP differ starkly 
across countries. More than 15 years ago, Scarrow (1997, p. 259) distinguished 
between ‘those who use their seats as stepping-stones for winning (or regaining) 
national political office’, “European careerist[s]” who show a long and primary 
commitment to their European jobs” and those for whom the EP was an end-of-
career ‘dead-end’. MEPs from post-communist Member States may 
predominantly fall into the first or third category. Indeed, Whitaker (2014) shows 
that MEPs from the European periphery, which includes seven new Member 
States in his operationalization, are less likely to return to the EP. In line with this 
possibility, our analysis included a control variable capturing the participation in 
roll-call votes and is robust to including party group as well as national party 
loyalty (not reported). 
 
Theories of legislative organization might likewise help explain why MEPs from 
new Member States may have fewer incentives to act as rapporteur. Distributive 
theory suggests that MEPs who are preference outliers self-select into committees 
that advance their constituents' interests. For instance, rapporteurs in ENVI are 
preference outliers with ties to specific interest groups (Kaeding, 2004). MEPs 
from new Member States may have less strong preferences on the issues dealt 
with by these committees, making them less willing to invest their scarce 
resources in writing a report. 
 
Our evidence casts doubt on this line of reasoning, however, since under-
representation of MEPs from newer Member States is more pronounced for 
important co-decision (shadow) reports as opposed to other procedures, and 
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more widespread under lead as opposed to shadow reports. If they did not wish 
to act as rapporteur, they would hardly be willing to take on these reports, which 
are certainly less important. 
 
Lacking Skills? 
A second explanation centres on the skills required by (shadow) rapporteurs. 
Beauvallet and Michon (2010) show that in EP6, MEPs from the accession 
countries were more educated and more often had national parliamentary or 
ministerial experience than MEPs from the EU-15. Prima facie, this stacks the 
odds in favour of MEPs from the new Member States, as more educated MEPs 
are more likely to obtain reports (Daniel 2013). Further, our models take EP 
experience into account. Nevertheless, MEPs from newer Member States may 
have strengths in different fields that render them a better fit for other positions. 
More knowledge on the skills and expertise of MEPs might help us find out how 
this affects career paths. 
 
Disadvantage? 
MEPs may be disadvantaged for three principal reasons. MEPs whose national 
party is represented in the Council of Ministers are more likely to be allocated 
rapporteurships, suggesting an informational advantage of these MEPs, who can 
rely on their colleagues for information on positions in the Council (Hoyland, 
2006). If the second-order effect of European elections is strong in new Member 
States, non-government parties may perform particularly well, with negative 
consequences for the influence of the countries' MEPs. However, Schmitt (2005) 
presents evidence to the contrary. Likewise, MEPs may be more likely to become 
(shadow) rapporteur if their country holds the rotating presidency in the 
Council. In EP6, only two accession countries held the presidency, prima facie 
giving credence to the argument. However, our presidency control is in the 
opposite direction. 
 
A second reason might lie in the party groups' mechanisms for the allocation of 
reports. Upon successfully bidding for a report, party group co-ordinators 
allocate these to an MEP. Hence, allocation of co-ordinators may be the root of 
the ‘problem’: If MEPs from old Member States are over-represented on these 
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posts, they might be biased in favour of rapporteurs from their own countries. 
Obholzer and Kaeding (2012) discuss the representation of Member States in co-
ordinators' posts, showing that MEPs from newer Member States were under-
represented during EP6, but painting a fuzzier picture for EP7. These findings 
deserve more thorough investigation. 
 
A third explanation draws on informational (Krehbiel, 1991) and partisan (Cox 
and McCubbins, 1993) theories of legislative organization. These congressional 
theories can be used to develop hypotheses on the choice of rapporteurs based 
on preferences of the plenary and party groups respectively. According to the 
informational theory, rapporteurs should be representative of the plenary 
median, and according to the partisan theory, they should be representative of 
the party (group) median. If MEPs from newer Member States happen to be 
preference outliers with respect to either reference group, these theories predict 
that they would indeed be allocated fewer rapporteurships. However, we control 
for loyalty to the national party and European party group (not reported) and do 
not find support for this line of reasoning. 
 
Implications 
We have shown that MEPs from new Member States were considerably less 
likely to be allocated lead rapporteurships, and for the first time confirmed that 
this finding surprisingly also holds for shadow reports under co-decision, which 
are the shadow reports that matter most. Accordingly, the argument that the 
integration of MEPs from the accession states has been ‘much less of a challenge 
than originally feared’ (De Clerck-Sachsse and Kaczyński, 2009, p. 4) should be 
reviewed critically. The findings challenge future research on report allocation 
and legislative careers inside and beyond the EP to help shed light on the 
different readings of the results that we offer. Only if future studies are sensitive 
to inter-country variation in MEPs' characteristics and ambitions (see Scully et 
al., 2012) will a conclusive answer to the question of the causes of under-
representation of MEPs be found. Likewise, it would be desirable to scrutinize 
questions of learning and its timeframe based on earlier rounds of enlargement 
to gauge how they compare. 
 
22 
 
Meanwhile, the findings imply that MEPs from the new Member States are more 
rarely in a position to influence EU policy. This might adversely affect the 
legitimacy of European integration in these countries. Therefore, MEPs from the 
newer Member States may want to thrust themselves more actively into the 
competition for rapporteurships during the 2014–19 legislative term. If a 
European elite is emerging in the EP (Whitaker, 2014; Beauvallet and Michon, 
2010), national parties might want to optimize their candidate selection in order 
to ascertain that a share of their MEPs are committed to a longer-term career at 
the European level. 
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Online Supplement 
 
Table A: Logit Regressions: Report allocation in the 7th European Parliament 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 All reports Co-decision Own initiative Consultation 
MEP from accession state 0.49*** 0.56*** 0.64** 1.18 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.33) 
Chair or Vice-Chair 2.29*** 1.52** 1.91*** 1.67* 
 (0.67) (0.32) (0.39) (0.47) 
Share of term served 40.26*** 22.11*** 15.10*** 15.05*** 
 (16.01) (10.68) (6.09) (11.63) 
Attendance 1.04*** 1.03*** 1.01 1.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EP experience 1.18* 1.09 0.90 1.26** 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) 
Female 1.59** 1.02 1.19 1.11 
 (0.37) (0.19) (0.21) (0.30) 
Council Presidency 0.97 0.83 1.11 0.84 
 (0.21) (0.15) (0.19) (0.22) 
EPP 1.18 0.95 1.20 0.91 
 (0.40) (0.26) (0.31) (0.33) 
S&D 1.60 1.02 1.71** 0.63 
 (0.57) (0.29) (0.46) (0.25) 
GREENS 0.82 1.07 1.23 0.39 
 (0.37) (0.40) (0.44) (0.25) 
ECR 1.71 1.15 1.34 0.56 
 (0.83) (0.44) (0.49) (0.32) 
EUL-NGL 0.70 0.60 0.89 0.71 
 (0.33) (0.27) (0.37) (0.46) 
EFD 0.19*** 0.35** 0.27*** - 
 (0.10) (0.18) (0.13) - 
NI 0.07*** 0.19*** 0.08*** 0.60 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.43) 
     
Committee control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 851 851 851 818 
Notes: *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Odds Ratios reported; Standard errors in parentheses; 
Reference Group: ALDE. Dependent variable: 0: no reports obtained, 1: at least one 
report obtained. 
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Table B: Logit Regressions: Shadow report allocation in the 7th European Parliament 
Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
 All reports Co-decision Own initiative Consultation 
MEP from accession state 0.77 0.66** 0.79 1.20 
 (0.18) (0.13) (0.16) (0.29) 
Chair or Vice-Chair 1.64 1.25 1.52* 0.87 
 (0.50) (0.28) (0.36) (0.23) 
Share of term served 30.47*** 8.87*** 21.50*** 25.16*** 
 (12.61) (3.25) (8.65) (16.46) 
Attendance 1.05*** 1.03*** 1.04*** 1.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EP experience 0.72*** 0.86* 0.71*** 0.76** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) 
Female 2.28*** 1.35 1.73*** 1.24 
 (0.58) (0.26) (0.34) (0.29) 
Council Presidency 0.79 0.89 0.90 0.80 
 (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) 
EPP 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.15*** 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
S&D 0.43* 0.43*** 0.22*** 0.35*** 
 (0.20) (0.13) (0.08) (0.11) 
GREENS 1.28 1.02 0.77 1.17 
 (0.86) (0.44) (0.38) (0.46) 
ECR 1.00 1.30 0.83 1.00 
 (0.64) (0.60) (0.41) (0.42) 
EUL-NGL 1.39 1.48 1.35 2.28* 
 (0.99) (0.72) (0.77) (1.02) 
EFD 0.29** 0.45* 0.23*** 0.49 
 (0.18) (0.22) (0.12) (0.27) 
NI 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) 
     
Committee control Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 851 851 851 851 
Notes: *p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Odds Ratios reported; Standard errors in parentheses; 
Reference Group: ALDE. Dependent variable: 0: no shadow reports obtained, 1: at least 
one shadow report obtained. 
 
 
